| Call Number (LC) | Title | Results |
|---|---|---|
| S 1.163/2-2:23-23 | USAID's Afghanistan peace support initiative : audit costs incurred by DAI Global LLC | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:10-2 | Afghanistan's High Office of Oversight needs significantly strengthened authority, independence, and donor support to become an effective anti-corruption institution | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:10-10 | ANA garrison at Gamberi appears well built overall but some construction issues need to be addressed | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-7 | Commander's Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province provided some benefits, but oversight weaknesses and sustainment concerns led to questionable outcomes and potential waste | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-8 | Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program has reached thousands of Afghan communities, but faces challenges that could limit outcomes | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-9 | ANA facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat generally met construction requirements, but contractor oversight should be strengthened | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-10 | Despite improvements in MoI's personnel systems additional actions are needed to completely verify ANP payroll costs and workforce strength | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-11 | USAID's Kabul community development program largely met the agreement's terms, but progress toward long-term goals needs to be better tracked | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-12 | U.S. agencies have provided training and support to Afghanistan's major crimes task force, but reporting and reimbursement issues need to be addressed | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-13 | Limited interagency coordination and insufficient controls over U.S. funds in Afghanistan hamper U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan financial sector and safeguard U.S. cash | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-14 | The World Bank and the Afghan government have established mechanisms to monitor and account for funds contributed to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, but some limitations and challenges should be addressed | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-15 | Weaknesses in the USACE Defense Base Act insurance program led to as much as $58.5 million in refunds not returned to the U.S. government and other problems | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:11-17 | The U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan has cost nearly $2 billion, and state should continue to strengthen Its management and oversight of the funds transferred to other agencies | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-1 | Actions needed to better assess and coordinate capacity-building efforts at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-2 | Better planning and oversight could have reduced construction delays and costs at the Kabul Military Training Center | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-3 | Afghan National Security University has experienced cost growth and schedule delays, and contract administration needs improvement | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-4 | DOD improved its accountability for vehicles provided to the Afghan national security forces, but should follow up on end-use monitoring findings | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-6 | Afghan First initiative has placed work with Afghan companies, but is affected by inconsistent contract solicitation and vetting, and employment data is limited | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-7 | C-JTSCC has taken steps to improve the accuracy of its contract data, but it should assess the feasibility of correcting data for fiscal year 2009 and earlier | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-9 |
USAID has disbursed $9.5 billion for reconstruction and funded some financial audits as required, but many audits face significant delays, accountability limitations, and lack of resources USAID spent almost $400 million on an Afghan stabilization project despite uncertain results, but has taken steps to better assess similar efforts |
2 |